Monday, 28 May 2012

Fear and Loathing and Windows 8

(Or: Why Windows 8 Scares Me -- and Should Scare You Too)

I was very excited when I saw the first demos of Windows 8.  After years of settling for mediocre incremental improvements in its core products, Microsoft finally was ready to make bold changes to Windows, something I thought it had to do to stay relevant in computing.  What's more, the changes looked really nice!  Once I'd seen the clean, modern-looking videos of Windows 8, the old Windows looked cramped and a little embarrassing, kind of like finding a picture of the way you dressed when you were a senior in high school (link).

So when Microsoft announced that it was releasing a "consumer preview" of Windows 8, I couldn't wait to play with it.  So far I've installed Windows 8 on two computers, a middle of the road HP laptop and a mini tablet PC from Japan.  I've browsed the web and used Office and even tested our new app, Zekira, on it.  My conclusion is that Windows 8 in its current form is very different; attractive in some ways, and disturbing in others.  It combines an interesting new interface with baffling changes to Windows compatibility, and amateur mistakes in customer messaging.  Add up all the changes, and I am very worried that Microsoft may be about to shoot itself in the foot spectacularly.  Even the plain colorful graphics in Windows 8 that looked so cool when I first saw them are starting to look ominous to me, like the hotel decor in The Shining.

Why you should care.  The rollout of Windows 8 has very important implications for not just Microsoft but everyone in the tech industry.  In normal times, most people are unwilling to reconsider the basic decisions they have made about operating system and applications.  They've spent a huge amount of time learning how to use the system, and the last thing they want to do is start learning all over again.  That's why the market share of a standard like Windows is so stable over time.  But when a platform makes a major transition, people are forced to stop and reconsider their purchase.  They're going to have to learn something new anyway, so for a brief moment they are open to possibly switching to something else.  The more relearning people have to do, the more willing they are to switch.  Rapid changes in OS and app market share usually happen during transitions like this.

Windows 8 is a revolutionary transition in Windows, easily the biggest change since the move from DOS to Windows in the early 1990s.  Consider the wreckage that was created by that transition:
    --Apple's effort to retake the lead in personal computing was stopped dead
    --The leading app companies of the time were destroyed (Lotus, WordPerfect, Ashton Tate, etc)
    --IBM was eventually forced out of the PC business
    --Microsoft, formerly an also-ran in apps, became the leading applications company, and a power in server software as well

Will the Windows 8 transition be as disruptive?  It's impossible to say at this point.  But huge changes are possible.  If the transition is successful, Microsoft could emerge as a much stronger, more dynamic company, leveraging its sales leadership in PCs to get a powerful position in tablets, mobile devices, and online services.  On the other hand, if Windows 8 fails, Microsoft could break the loyalty of its customer base and turn its genteel decline into a catastrophic collapse.  The most likely outcome, of course, is a muddled middle.  But based on what I've seen of Windows 8 so far, I am a lot closer to the rout scenario than I expected to be. 

Whatever the outcome for Microsoft, what's certain is that because so many people use Windows as the foundation of their computing, the transition to Windows 8 will produce threats and opportunities for everyone else in the tech industry.  Play your cards right and your company could grow rapidly.  Mess up and you could be the next Lotus.  You may love Windows 8 or you may hate it, but if you work in tech you'd be a fool to ignore it.

And yet, most of my friends in Silicon Valley are paying very little attention to Windows 8.  Most of them haven't tried it, and don't know a lot about what it does.  There are a lot of Mac users in the Valley; they don't think about Windows at all.  But even among the Windows users I talk to, the OS isn't a trendy topic; there is a lot more excitement about Android, Facebook, and whatever product Apple just announced.

If you're one of those Windows-fatigued people, it's time to wake up.  Here's a summary of my experiences with Windows 8, followed by some thoughts on what it means for the industry...


Listening to Windows 8

The most important message I want you to understand is this: Windows 8 is not Windows.  Although Microsoft calls it Windows, and a lot of Windows code may still be present under the hood, Windows 8 is a completely new operating system in every way that matters to users.  It looks different, it works differently, and it forces you to re-learn much of what you know today about computers.  From a user perspective, Microsoft Windows is being killed this fall and replaced by an entirely new OS that has a Windows 7 emulator tacked onto it.

The main Windows 8 interface is based on Microsoft's Metro design language, which was supposedly inspired in part by the directional signs used in public transportation (link).  Metro emphasizes typography (big words in clean fonts) and simple monochrome images, like the signs you'd see on a subway platform. 

About Metro.  Instead of application icons, Metro features large rectangles (or tiles) in primary colors which are clicked to launch apps, and which can also display live content (like the time or a message).  The Metro look is also used in several other Microsoft products, including Windows Phone 7. 


I think Metro looks incredibly nice.  The graphics are clean and bold, the animations are smooth, and overall it's one of the most visually literate things I've ever seen from Microsoft.  I'm still kind of amazed that Metro is a Microsoft product.

The simplicity of Metro is very appealing in many ways, especially when viewed against Apple's interface, which is becoming more and more encrusted with strange textures and bits of faux 3D gewgaw.  TK commented on this blog a year ago that Apple is falling into skeuomorphism, a situation in which digital designs retain bits of their physical counterparts even though they're no longer necessary (link).  That theme recently cropped up in an interview with Apple designer Jonathan Ive, in which he ducked a question about Apple's software look by saying he's only responsible for hardware (link).

Metro is one of the most anti-skeuomorphic interface designs I've seen, which makes it a worthy counterpoint to Apple.

I worry about whether Metro's clean look will last once third parties start adding apps to it.  The first few independent Metro apps I've seen use the tile as an advertisement rather than making it blend into the Metro look.  Check out the effect:


Just a little bit of this makes Metro look like a scenic highway lined with billboards.  That's not much of a step up from today's Windows.

A Microsoft services buffet.  The second striking thing about Metro in Windows 8 is that it's a serving platter of Microsoft online services.  Most of the tiles you see when you start Windows 8 are Microsoft services, ready to launch with a simple log-in through your Microsoft ID. 

Apple has a habit of featuring its own services on its devices, and we all know how Google manipulates Android to feature its tools, but I don't think I've ever seen a platform vendor push so many of its own services so aggressively.

More than a visual change.  In addition to its signature look, Metro also dramatically changes how you use the computer.  There is no menu bar in the main Metro view, and no file icons.  In fact, almost all computer controls are hidden, other than the tiles for launching apps.

To control the computer you have to hover your mouse or your finger in the corner of the screen to bring up a popup set of tools.  Lower left is the popup to take you back from an application to the Start screen; lower right brings up an icon bar called Charms for common functions like the control panel.

The Charms bar is the black strip on the right side of the screen.

The main screen is only for launching applications. File management is now separate from app control, and it's not clear to me if you're even expected to manage files in Metro.  Like the iPhone and iPad, files are more or less hidden, or managed within individual applications.  If you want to deal with them directly, you're apparently expected to use Windows 7 compatibility mode (see below).

Separating app and file management is an interesting move, and I kind of like it in theory. It was never completely intuitive that in the Mac/Windows desktop metaphor, some icons represented tools while other icons represented your documents.  The desktop metaphor implied that you were dealing with pieces of paper that you could move around and store in various places, so why could you drag around an application the same way you could drag around a document?  In terms of the metaphor, this was like storing your stapler and telephone in a file cabinet.  Early versions of Mac and especially Windows created all sorts of strange workarounds to ease management of files and apps, and prevent confusion between them.  Microsoft created the Start menu, Apple added the icon dock at the bottom of the screen.  Both were basically kludges that papered over holes in the metaphor.

But they were kludges that we've all become accustomed to.  Every Windows user is now trained that you use the Start menu to launch apps and manage the computer.  There is no Start menu in Metro, so you're going to have a lot of deeply confused people fumbling around trying to find critical computer functions.

This might be easier to manage if there were a new metaphor to Metro that would make it intuitive to guess where the functions are now located.  That was part of the strength of the desktop metaphor.  You had files, and folders that contained files, and applications that acted on the files.  Apple even called some of its early applications desk accessories.  This let people guess fairly reliably at how to use the computer, and where to find the things they were looking for.

But Metro doesn't have a central metaphor.  Or maybe I should say that its central metaphor is very limited.  Subway signs are effective for displaying small amounts of information, but nobody uses a subway sign to carry out a task.  Metro biases Windows 8 toward information consumption rather than creation, a recurring theme that I'll discuss more below.  That may be great for a media tablet, but what does it do for someone who uses Windows for business productivity?

I'm drawn to a quote from the Jonathan Ive profile that I referenced above.  He said:

"Simplicity is not the absence of clutter, that's a consequence of simplicity. Simplicity is somehow essentially describing the purpose and place of an object and product. The absence of clutter is just a clutter-free product. That's not simple."

There are times when I feel like Windows 8 is focused too much on being clutter-free, at the expense of complicating the things that most people do with PCs.


There is a second user interface in Windows 8, and it looks like traditional Windows.  You get to it by clicking a Metro tile called Windows Explorer.  Windows Explorer (not to be confused with Internet Explorer) takes over the screen, and makes the the PC look a lot like Windows 7, with a few minor cosmetic tweaks and a couple of very important deletions.
   
It's the deletions that worry me about Windows 8.  The most successful OS transitions in history allowed users to keep using their old habits and applications while they gradually got used to the new stuff.  For example, Windows coexisted with MS-DOS for many years before it took over the PC (as Microsoft lovingly detailed in a long post here). I can tell you from personal experience that Apple found it almost impossible to convert PC users to Mac during the Windows transition, because there was no point at which the DOS installed base felt abandoned.  They could continue using the old DOS commands for as long as they wanted, until they felt ready to move to Windows.

To Microsoft's credit, it is enabling old Windows applications to continue to work in Windows 8.  But some other key features of Windows are being removed, forcing users to switch to the Metro equivalents now, whether they feel ready or not.

The paragraphs below describe some of my concerns about Windows 8.  (If you'd like to see a demo of the problems, watch the video).




The Start menu is gone.  As I mentioned earlier, there is no Start menu in Metro.  That's not such a big deal -- you expect changes like that in a new interface.  But the Start menu has also been removed from Windows Explorer.  It's no longer present anywhere.  If you're not familiar with Windows, you won't understand how central the Start menu is to a Windows user.  It's the thing you generally use to turn the computer on and off, launch applications, open file folders, search, and access the control panel.  Recent changes have also made it a preferred place for directly opening documents.

In Windows 8, the functions formerly done by Start have been spread across several locations, some in the Metro interface and some in Windows Explorer.  So Windows users moving to Windows 8 will have to learn parts of Metro before they can get anything done.  In some cases, common functions formerly available through a single click in Start have been buried several clicks deep within Metro.

If you're not a Windows user, it is hard to describe how disorienting this is.  It's roughly equivalent to giving someone a car in which the steering wheel has been replaced by a joystick.  Not only do you need to learn how to steer with a joystick, but all of the controls formerly attached to the steering column are now scattered in various spots on the dashboard.  The wiper control is a lever above the radio, the high beam lights are a switch on the rearview mirror, the turn signal is a set of buttons under the speedometer, and the cruise control is a dial hidden inside the ashtray.  Oh, and you honk the horn by bouncing up and down in your seat.

The car's designer will give you logical explanations for every change they made in the car, just as Microsoft can explain the reasons for removing Start.  For a new user they may all make sense.  But for an existing user, the removal of Start forces a huge amount of re-learning.  An existing Windows user can't just sit down with Windows 8 and start using it.  They'll need some sort of tutorial and reference system to show them how to use it, and to answer questions when they get confused.

Microsoft has not forced discontinuities like this in past transitions.  The best example is the preservation of the DOS command line interface, the equivalent of the Start menu for people who used DOS.  The command line function has been available in every version of Windows to date, and in fact it's still supported in Windows 8.

The dreaded DOS-style command line in Windows 8.

Control panels are missing.  Many of the old control panel functions from Windows are accessible through the Settings Charm in Metro.  But some of them aren't.  I don't know if that means Microsoft hasn't finished adding them to Metro, or if they have decided to eliminate some controls.  Based on what Microsoft has said online, I think it's the latter -- one recurring theme in Metro is that Microsoft is trying to hide some complexity in order to make the OS more approachable.  I understand the motivation, but for an existing user this actually makes the OS more complex.

Case in point: in Metro I can't find a power management function allowing me to control when my laptop sleeps and how much power it uses when running on batteries.  I looked through every tab in the Metro settings, and finally realized the function just wasn't there.  After searching online, I found a way to access the old Control Panels through Windows Explorer.  But it's not in an intuitive place.

For a user, there's no easy way to tell if a particular control panel feature has been relocated to a new spot in Charms, eliminated, or hidden within Windows Explorer.  You just have to fumble around and cuss for a while until you figure it out.

How do I turn this thing off?  The concept of a power button is pretty central to any electronic device.  You turn it on in order to use it, and you turn it off when you're done.  It's easy to turn on a Windows 8 computer; you just press the power button on the computer.  But pressing the button again does not turn off the computer.  Instead, it puts the computer to sleep.

Sleep is a good thing in a computer.  It lets a computer restart quickly, and keeps your apps active.  But it does consume power, which is an issue for ecologically-conscious desktop users, and a primary concern for laptop users.  Also, I find that it's helpful to turn off Windows from time to time because the OS gradually becomes confused and slow as you launch and quit large numbers of apps. So I expect to be able to easily turn off my computer, and I think most Windows users will feel the same way.


It is absurdly difficult to turn off Windows 8.  So difficult that there are entire web pages devoted to tutorials on how to do it.  CNET wrote an unintentionally hilarious article detailing four different ways to turn off Windows 8, each more baroque than the last (link).  Here's what CNET called the "most basic" way:

"In the Metro interface, hover your mouse over the Zoom icon that appears in the lower right corner of the screen. The Charms bar should then pop up displaying several icons. Moving your mouse up the screen will reveal the names of each icon, including Search, Share, Start, Devices, and Settings. Click the Settings icon and then the Power Icon. You should see three options: Sleep, Restart, and Shut down. Clicking Shut down will close Windows 8 and turn off your PC."

So shutdown requires five actions: a hover, a sweep, and three clicks.  Plus the command is hidden in a very non-intuitive place.  People used to joke that only Microsoft could think it was intuitive to have the Shut Down command hidden under the Start button.  I think it's sooooo much more intuitive to have it hidden under Settings.

I don't know why Microsoft chose to make it so hard to turn off Windows 8.  Some of the online reviews have suggested that Microsoft believes people should only put their computers to sleep instead of turning them off.  Maybe, but that's a pretty controlling assumption, especially for laptop users.  Or perhaps Microsoft optimized Windows 8 only for tablets and views the entire PC thing as an afterthought.

Whatever the intent, I am concerned that it's so hard to perform such a common function.  But what's much more alarming is that there are several redundant, complex ways to perform that common function.  When that happens, it's usually a sign of confusion in the development team.

Windows 8 is not designed for PCs.  I know that's a very sweeping statement, but in a couple of areas Windows 8 is clearly designed to work better for media tablets than for traditional personal computers.  The first is the general architecture of the interface.  Despite Microsoft's protestations to the contrary, Metro is clearly optimized for use on a touchscreen device rather than a keyboard and mouse PC.  You can force it to work with a mouse, but many of the things you have to do feel awkward, and are more complex than their old Windows equivalents.  One good example is the finger swipe, which works very well with a touch screen but is unpleasant on a notebook computer because you can't easily click and drag on a trackpad for long distances.  Parts of Windows 8 (for example, logging in to the computer) require finger swipes.

I long to see what Metro could do on a PC equipped with a gesture recognition system like Kinect.  That might be a revolutionary change worth migrating to.  Microsoft says that is coming, but Kinect, Metro, and Windows 8 are not yet fully integrated (link).  That's unfortunate, since developers are working on Metro apps now.

Windows 8 is also designed with tablet-like tasks in mind.  Productivity and information creation tasks are compromised to make the OS more attractive for content consumption.  Microsoft was very explicit about this in some of its online commentary (link):

"People, not files, are the center of activity.  There has been a marked change in the kinds of activities people spend time doing on the PC. In balance to “traditional” PC activities such as writing and creating, people are increasingly reading and socializing, keeping up with people and their pictures and their thoughts, and communicating with them in short, frequent bursts. Life online is moving faster and faster, and people are progressively using their PCs to keep up with and participate in that. And much of this activity and excitement is happening inside the web browser, in experiences built using HTML and other web technologies."

Let me translate that for you: "We're optimizing Windows for using Facebook and YouTube at the expense of performing productivity tasks."  Which is fine; it's a design choice Microsoft is free to make.  But it's going to have an impact on the large base of people trying to get work done with a PC.

Incomplete support of existing hardware.  In the first announcements of Windows 8, Microsoft bragged about how efficient it is.  The company said explicitly that it would put less burden on hardware than Windows 7, and demonstrated Windows 8 running on old low-featured computers (link).  In several places I've seen Windows 8 described as a great way to revive an old laptop.  Unfortunately, although Windows 8 may have a light hardware footprint, it has compatibility problems with some existing hardware, including some Windows 7 computers.  Computers designed for Vista can have much more serious problems.  This became very clear to me when I installed Windows 8 on my Vista-based mini tablet PC.  Windows 8 is not compatible with the wireless network chips in my tablet PC, so it can no longer connect to the Internet.

More importantly, the touch screen isn't fully compatible with Windows 8.  I can't get the system to recognize taps in the outer half-inch of the screen, meaning that I can't activate the Metro Start function or the Charms panel.  Fortunately, my tablet PC has a keyboard, so I can use the trackpad to control it.  But who wants a tablet PC that doesn't have a working touch interface?

The severity of this problem varies from computer to computer, but it's apparently fairly common.  For example, here's video of an Acer user with some of the same troubles, although not as severe as mine (he can activate the controls some of the time; link). 

There is no workaround for this problem other than buying a new computer.  So its promise of running well on existing hardware turned out to be an exaggeration. 

Microsoft recently discussed the problem in an elaborate blog post describing touch screen compatibility under Windows 8 (link).  The tests documented by Microsoft show a lot of Windows 7 devices interpreting gestures properly only 70% to 80% of the time (the ratio is even worse for some features).  A success rate of 95% is required for Windows 8 certification, so a lot of Windows 7 touchscreen computers (Microsoft doesn't say how many) would fail to pass certification.  The article concludes:

"The vast majority of Windows 7 touchscreens can be used with Windows 8...with a reasonable degree of success."

I applaud Microsoft for coming clean about the problem, but I hate to see them use those qualifiers in their statements.  Lawyers love words like "vast majority" and "reasonable degree" because they sound good but don't quantify anything, so you can't be sued.  The reality is that if you want to be sure Windows 8 will work at its best, you should buy a new computer bundled with it.  This is especially true of touchscreen PCs, the devices that stand to benefit the most from Metro's touch oriented features. 

I don't actually have a problem with that.  Providing backward compatibility is always difficult when you upgrade an OS, and considering the complexity of the Windows hardware base, it would be surprising if everything worked right.  However, what I do have a problem with is that other parts of Microsoft are ignoring the subtle compatibility story and continuing to claim that all Windows 7 hardware is fully compatible. 

For example, Antoine Leblond, the VP of Windows Web Services, implies that Windows 8 will run on every Windows 7 device (link):

"We’ve just passed the 500 million licenses sold mark for Windows 7, which represents half a billion PCs that could be upgraded to Windows 8 on the day it ships. That represents the single biggest platform opportunity available to developers."

Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer continues to quote that half billion number in public (link).

This isn't just misleading to customers and developers, it may also hurt Microsoft by setting unrealistic expectations.  If twenty percent of the Windows 7 installed base upgrades to Windows 8 in the first three months, is that a raging success or a humiliating failure?  I might view it as a very promising start, but Microsoft's own hype says it would be a disaster.

Failing to warn users of potential problems.  Speaking of miscommunication, Microsoft didn't clearly tell users that the Windows 8 preview is a one-way installation.  The word "preview" implies to many people an advanced sample that you can play with for a while and then toss aside.  But unless you have the original installation disks that came with your computer, the Windows 8 preview replaces your current OS and can't be removed.  Even if you do have those disks, on many PCs (including mine) the factory install disks wipe the hard drive and do a new install from scratch, deleting all your files and applications. 

Microsoft did disclose this information on the Windows 8 preview site, but the disclosure was written in bureaucratic language that didn't make clear the risk, and what's worse, that text was below the "Install" button, meaning a user could easily miss it.  (In the latest version of Microsoft's site, the automated installer for Windows 8 has been removed [gee, I wonder why] and you can only install by burning an installation disk on a DVD.  That makes it much harder for casual users to install the preview, and the warning is now above the download links.)

If you want a measure of how many people missed the warning, do a web search for "uninstall Windows 8."  Be prepared to read some angry commentary.

I think the next round in this cycle of frustration is going to come early next year, when the Windows 8 preview expires and preview users are required to purchase Windows 8 to keep their computers working.  The fact that there's an expiration date on the preview is something else that Microsoft didn't prominently disclose.


What it means.  I could go on, but I hope you get the idea.  Windows 8 is a very interesting, provocative, even courageous product.  But I'm not sure it's going to succeed.  My concerns are in two areas.  The first is that I'm not sure what burning problem Windows 8 solves for what group of users.  If you're a productivity worker, Windows 8 does very little for you, and in fact probably makes your life harder.  If you're most interested in entertainment and accessing online content, Metro is a big improvement over Windows -- but aren't you likely to already have a smartphone or tablet?
   
My second concern is the emotional feel I get from Windows 8.  I know that's a really vague comment, so let me try to tie it down a bit.  I think I'm a fairly sophisticated user.  I've used every version of Windows since 2.0.  When I worked in the competitive team at Apple, we tested every bizarre computer operating system we could find around the world, including stuff written in Japanese with no English-language documentation.  We made all of it work.  But there are still some parts of Windows 8 that I haven't been able to figure out, and other parts that I understand but that annoy me every time I touch them. 

Because of its problems, Windows 8 isn't fun to use, at least for me.  Whatever sense of joy I get from the cool new graphics is outweighed by a feeling that my productivity is being reduced.  Think of the best new app or website you've ever discovered; the feeling you got the first time you understood the power of Twitter or you created a presentation and it came out looking great.  That feeling of empowerment and excitement is critical to getting people started with a new technology.  But Windows 8 makes makes me feel limited and cramped.  It isn't a launch pad, it's a cage.

If Windows 8 is a problem for me, what's it going to do to a typical Windows user who just wants to get work done and doesn't have time to learn something new?  And what sort of support burden is it going to put on the IT managers of the world?


What works well.  Out of fairness to Microsoft, I should tell you that there are some things about Windows 8 that I love.  It looks beautiful.  On my computers it's pretty darned fast for a lot of functions (for example, booting and switching in and out of the Start screen).  Other people have reported some performance problems, but I expect those in what's essentially beta software.  An OS almost always gets faster right before it ships, because the last thing the engineers do is strip out all the diagnostic code they were using to track bugs.

For the control panel functions that Microsoft chose to implement in Metro, I think the interface is much cleaner and more intuitive than it was in the horribly overloaded Windows Control Panel.  This is where you'd expect Metro to shine, because it's optimized for giving directions, and a control panel gives directions to your computer.  I was also delighted to see a function in Windows 8 called "Refresh your PC without affecting your files."  Every Windows user knows that the performance of Windows goes south after a year or two as various bits of software gunk build up.  Unfortunately, the refresh function does erase your third party apps (unless you got them through the Windows 8 store).  If Windows 8 had a "refresh my PC without deleting my third party applications" function, I'd upgrade just for that.

Unfortunately, that's not the only feature of Windows 8.


Impact of Windows 8

For Microsoft: A huge roll of the dice. I've spent the last several weeks asking myself why Microsoft chose to remove some Windows 7 features and exaggerate the prospects for Windows 8. 

There are many possible explanations.  It could just be arrogance -- they believe they can force customers to do what they want.  It could be an excess of designer zeal -- designers always think people will fall in love with their creations once they try them.

But it could also be insecurity. To me, it feels like Microsoft is in a quiet panic.  When Apple says the era of the PC has ended, I think Microsoft may believe it even more than Apple does.  Smartphones eat away at messaging, tablets compete for browsing and game-playing, and who knows what will come next.  In the new device markets, Microsoft is an also-ran.  I think Microsoft feels it must find a way to leverage its waning strength in PCs to make itself relevant in mobile.

Step one is to deploy the same look and feel on all classes of devices, so people have an incentive to use only Microsoft products.  Microsoft tried first to take the Windows look and feel to mobile devices, but that failed because it was too ugly and hard to use.  So instead, Microsoft is now replacing the Windows look and feel with something designed for mobile.

The second step is to undercut the iPad (and Android tablets, if they ever start to sell) by selling PCs that also work great as tablets.  Microsoft's pitch is that instead of buying a separate PC and tablet, you should buy one thing that bridges both usages.  So we should expect a big push for convertible Windows 8 touch notebooks this fall.

Step three is to drive the transition to Metro as quickly as possible.  I think Microsoft is scared that it might be permanently closed out of the new markets, so it wants to force people onto Metro before that happens.  I believe that's really why it eliminated the Start menu.  If Start is still there, Windows users could live for years without learning much about Metro.  But with Start gone, Windows users will have to use bits of Metro now, and Microsoft believes they'll naturally embrace it once they've been forced to use it. 

Here's what Microsoft itself said in a blog post about the Windows 8 interface (link):

"Fundamentally, we believe in people and their ability to adapt and move forward. Throughout the history of computing, people have again and again adapted to new paradigms and interaction methods." 

I always get scared when a designer talks about the inevitability of people accepting a change.  It's like you're counting on some mystical law of nature to cause a migration, rather than enticing people to move by giving them something that works better than what they have today.  That's how the DOS to Windows transition worked -- people could (and did) continue to live in DOS for years until they learned how much more they could get done with Windows.  But Microsoft has decided to force the issue.  Then it rationalizes the decision with bromides like "we believe in people" and "the DOS users complained a lot too and look how that turned out." 

There can come a point where a company is so committed to a plan that it stops listening to complaints from its customers.  It feels like Microsoft may have reached that point.  If you complain about your inability to uninstall Windows 8, the problem is that you failed to read the fine print.  If you complain about the Start menu being missing, the problem is that you just don't have enough faith in humanity.

But the real lesson of history is not that you've got to have faith, it's that when people are forced to adopt a new computing paradigm they look around and reconsider their purchase.   
   
There's a range of possible outcomes from the Windows 8 launch: 

1. Windows users adopt Windows 8 enthusiastically.  I turn out to be a whiner.  Most Windows users don't miss the Start menu, and they fall all over Windows 8 in glee.  Microsoft gets a nice revenue bump from all the upgrade sales, and the Windows licensees, sensing big opportunities, jump in with great new convertible tablet designs that make the iPad look tired.  App developers create astounding new Metro programs that make things like Office and Photoshop obsolete.  Microsoft's online services become dominant because of their ties to Metro.  The aura of success around Windows 8 drives increasing sales of Windows Phone, rescuing Nokia from irrelevance.  Android tablet is obliterated, and sales of Android phones stall out as customers start to choose Windows Phone instead.  The big Asian phone companies recommit to Windows Phone and move their best engineering teams onto it.  Wall Street analysts short Apple's stock, declaring the era of iEverything over.

2. Windows users cling to Windows 7 tenaciously.  In this scenario, Windows 8 becomes the new Vista.  Microsoft's anticipated revenue from Windows 8 upgrades does not materialize, hurting the company's stock price and forcing layoffs to maintain earnings.  Microsoft's hardware partners are left with big stockpiles of unsalable Windows 8 PCs which they have to write down.  This accelerates the share growth of the Asian PC makers, who can best withstand a price war.  HP kills its PC division, and Dell is in deep trouble.  Developers who bet on Metro have to live on canned tuna and string cheese.  Nokia, stuck with a minority platform that European operators don't want to carry, wrestles with huge cash flow problems.

3. Windows collapses.  Millions of Windows users, disenchanted with the changes in Windows 8, decide to switch to some other computing platform.  Microsoft's revenues drop alarmingly, and Windows 8 is labeled a failure, causing even more customers to migrate away in a self-perpetuating collapse of the Windows installed base.  Windows Phone is swept aside, turning Nokia into the "Finnish RIM".  Microsoft survives as a fragment selling Office and some server software.

The interesting thing about these scenarios is that the Windows installed base will choose the winner.  If the Windows users are enthusiastic, Microsoft prospers.  If they're passive, Microsoft suffers.  If they turn negative. Microsoft dies a gruesome death.  So you'd think that Microsoft would do everything in its power to make current Windows users feel comfortable and excited about moving to Windows 8.  Instead, they're being confronted with deliberate incompatibilities, indifference toward their needs, and a preview campaign for Windows 8 that has already disenchanted some of the most enthusiastic Windows users. 

Do you think I'm exaggerating?  Do a web search for "I hate Windows 8" vs. "I love Windows 8."  Here's what you'll find:

The rule of thumb for online comments is that for every message someone posts, another ten to 100 people feel the same way.  That means there may be several million Windows users already disenchanted by Windows 8, before it even ships.

Does that look like a blockbuster launch to you?

Note: I deleted the chart and text above because, as Dana on Seeking Alpha pointed out, the search I quoted appears to be wrong (link).  I don't know how I messed that up, and I apologize for the incorrect information.  The search I quoted showed "hate" exceeding "love" by about 3:1.  The reality is that apparently there are many more "I love Windows 8" comments than "I hate Windows 8", so I may be overstating the negative reaction.


What Microsoft should do.
  I believe Microsoft is overestimating the immediate risk of a collapse in PC sales due to tablets and other new devices, and underestimating the potential backlash against Windows 8.  A tablet -- any tablet -- just isn't a good substitute to a PC for many tasks.  Huge numbers of people still need PCs for productivity work, and won't abandon them quickly, if at all.  And no matter how much Microsoft tells itself that people are adaptable, the average Windows user is intensely practical and focused on getting work done rather than exploring magical new experiences.

Ironically, the biggest danger of a sudden collapse in PC sales comes from Microsoft's own effort to force users onto Metro.

The answer is very simple: Put the $%*!# Start menu back in Windows Explorer.  Apologize for the confusion, and explain that you've learned from your customers.  Then focus your work on making Metro apps so exciting that people want to migrate to it.

What will happen?  I doubt Microsoft will be willing to back down on eliminating the Start menu.  The company has invested too much ego in the decision at this point.  As a result, the runaway success described in Scenario 1 is very unlikely to happen.  I think scenario 2 is the most likely, if only because Windows users have already refused past migrations, and it's easy to stick with a behavior you know.  I would have called scenario 3 impossible a year ago, and it's still not likely.  But the more problems I see with Windows 8, the more I begin to believe it could happen.

But a lot depends on the actions of Microsoft's competitors.  You can't have a mass migration away from Windows unless there's a strong alternative to it.  That brings us to a discussion of Apple.


What will Apple do?

Ahhh, Steve.  If only you were around to see this.

Twenty-five years ago Microsoft copied the Mac interface and confined Macintosh to a tiny sliver of the PC market.  Despite all the progress you've made since then, Macintosh continues to command under 10% of the worldwide PC market.  But now, at long last, Windows is vulnerable to a potential knockout.  If the Windows 8 transition is as uncomfortable as I expect, you might be able to peel away large numbers of PC users and trigger a collapse of Windows sales.

You'd have to make some compromises, creating special Mac bundles with Windows emulators and file migration tools.  And you'd have to jump back into doing Mac vs. PC advertising, this time welcoming the guy with the dorky jacket into your club.  It's risky, and in some ways it's backward-looking at a time when Apple is looking forward to conquering television and maybe the auto market.  But the PC market is worth about $300 billion in revenue a year, at a time when it's becoming harder to maintain Apple's sales growth.  Where else can you so easily tap into that big a pool of revenue?  Besides, how cool would it be to finally be the leading PC platform in the world again, after all those years?  Talk about changing the world...

If Steve were here, I think he'd be sorely tempted to attack.  I don't know what Apple's new management will do.  But somebody in Redmond ought to be really scared of the possibility.


What about Google?


I'm sure I'm going to get messages saying that Chromebooks are a great substitute to Windows.  Others will say this is the big opening for Android tablets.

I don't see it.  Apple has at least a theoretical shot at Windows users because it has a complete personal computing platform plus the ability to add Windows compatibility to it.  After Windows 8, Apple can claim to have a better PC than the PC.  At this point, Google can't make that claim credibly.  Moving from Windows to either Android or Chrome would be a step down in productivity for most Windows users; more of a step down than Windows 8.

What Google should be thinking about, very hard, is the scenario in which Windows 8 is at least a partial success.  Android has a lot of momentum in smartphones, and will be very difficult to displace quickly.  But in tablets, Android is a very weak alternative to iPad.  I could picture a situation in which Windows 8 tablets become the iPad alternative, giving Microsoft a beach-head it can pour resources into.  If Windows 8 gets a toehold in any category, that could have a big effect on the phone market over time. 

I think many Android phone licensees are quietly looking for alternatives.  One of the original attractions of Android for hardware licensees was that it's royalty-free.  But the seemingly endless series of IP lawsuits against Android licensees have convinced many of them that Android isn't any cheaper in reality -- what you save in up-front licensing costs you lose in attorney fees, patent licenses, and general jerkiness by the OS vendor.  It doesn't help that Google just bought a major hardware company and is strongly rumored to be planning its own line of tablets designed to lower the entry price point for tablet computing.  Goody, think the licensees, now my own OS vendor is going to commoditize me.

At this point I think the main thing still holding licensees to Android is its sales momentum.  And that's a huge inducement.  Sales momentum matters to licensees more than anything else.  But that also means that if Windows gains some momentum, the licensees will be all over it.  They won't abandon Android, but the big companies like Samsung will look to create a balance between Google and Microsoft, so they can play them off against one another.


What it means to web companies 

If you work at someplace like Facebook or Twitter, you probably think this article isn't relevant to you.  Who cares what happens to Windows?  Let the old dinosaurs fight it out in OS, your world is online and the desktop doesn't matter to you.

If that's your thinking, I invite you to look again at that Metro start screen:


Those tiles, the first thing a user sees when starting Windows 8, almost all launch Microsoft online services.  They include:
  --An app store
  --Maps
  --Video
  --Photos
  --Messaging
  --Mail
  --Weather
  --Calendar
  --People
  --Camera
  --Music
  --SkyDrive
  --Finance
  --Four Xbox-related items
  --Reader, and
  --A browser (Internet Explorer)

In other words, Windows 8 showcases Microsoft's equivalents to many of the most popular online services from Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Apple.  Many of the apps are gorgeous, by the way.  Here's a sample of Bing Finance in Metro:


Imagine 90% of the world's computer-using population seeing those tiles every day.  How long before they click on one of them out of curiosity?  And if they like that one, how many more will they try?  Picture Microsoft pushing new tiles into Windows 8 whenever it wants to compete with another web service.  And remind yourself that platform transitions usually cause people to reconsider their app choices.

If you still think you can ignore Windows 8, go right ahead.  But if I were you, I'd be preparing a Metro version of my tablet app, very quickly.


What to do if you're an app developer

This is the hardest question to answer.  Platform transitions create a wonderful opportunity for developers because customers are most willing to look at new apps when they first try a platform.  If you get in there early with a great Windows 8 Metro app, your company might take off spectacularly.  If a competitor does Metro first, you'll be vulnerable.

On the other hand, if you bet big on Windows 8 and it fails, you'll be stuck.  Even if it just sells slowly at first, you could easily run out of money before Microsoft fixes the problem.  A poor quarter is a bump in the road for Microsoft; it could be an extinction event for you.

If I were creating a new application today...oh, wait, I am creating a new application today.  So here's how the situation looks to me:

If you have a PC app today, should you be sure it works on Windows 8?  Yes, of course.  At the minimum, make sure it runs in Windows 7 compatibility mode.

Should you we revise the app to take advantage of the Metro interface?  If you have a bunch of extra money, sure.  But if you're not awash in surplus funds, I would hold off for now.  It's a risk, but I think most Windows 8 users are going to linger in traditional Windows mode for a long time, and that's the market you need to serve first.

When should you do Metro?  When Microsoft demonstrates significant sales volume of genuine Metro users.  The best way to track this is probably sales of Windows 8 tablets, as opposed to PCs preloaded with Windows 8.  You don't know how many Windows 8 PCs are having Windows 7 backloaded onto them, but a tablet with Windows 8 is probably running Metro.

The next question at that point will be who's buying those Metro tablets and what are they being used for.  Are they being bought for entertainment?  If so, you probably don't want to port your business app to it.


Conclusion

Here's what I'd like you to take away from this article:

    --Windows 8 is not Windows, it's a new operating system with Windows 7 compatibility tacked onto it.
    --Although Windows 8 looks pretty and is great for tablet-style content consumption, I question its benefits for traditional PC productivity tasks.
    --Big OS transitions like this one traditionally cause users to reconsider their OS decision and potentially switch to something else.
    --Microsoft has worsened the risk that people will migrate away from Windows 8, by disabling some key features of Windows 7, and mishandling the consumer "preview" program.
    --However, people won't necessarily abandon Windows because it's not clear if they have a good alternative to it.
    --Apple could provide the best alternative if it chooses to.  This might be Apple's best chance ever to stick a fork in Windows.
    --If Windows 8 is even moderately successful, it could weaken Google and the big web services companies.  The trend toward bundling web services into the OS is potentially very disruptive to the web community, and they should be quite worried about it.
    --If you're a PC app developer, you should probably hold off on Metro because it's not clear how quickly its user base will grow.


What do you think? 

Thanks for sticking around through a very long article.  I'd like to hear what you think; please post a comment.  Do you believe Windows 8 will take off?  Should app developers support it now?  Would you change anything in it?  If so, what?

Corrected on May 29, 2012. Updated in October 2012 to point to revised video.

Sunday, 13 May 2012

Yahoo: The Worst Way Ever to Pick a Corporate Strategy

So Yahoo has burned through another CEO, and I'm sure the next step will be a lot of media sermonizing about the need to be honest in your resume, the power of the Internet to rally outrage around an issue, and importance of making an immediate and full disclosure/apology when you're in the wrong.  All good lessons.

But to me the most important issue, and I think a damning one, was contained in this comment down at the bottom of Kara Swisher's article on the resignation (link):

"Thompson was pushing forward a vision of adding a much more significant data and commerce element to Yahoo’s largely ad-based business.  That is likely to be less stressed under media-focused Levinsohn, who will be essentially trying out to be the permanent CEO."

A number of other articles say the same thing, that the change in CEO (and Board members) will also mean a change in Yahoo's strategy (link).

For as long as I can remember, Yahoo has seemed unable to decide whether it was a media company or a technology company.  As a result it has usually seemed to optimize for neither one.  Technology assets like Flickr languish, promising API initiatives wither on the vine, and competitors gradually eat away at Yahoo's display advertising franchise.

Articles like Swisher's said Scott Thompson wanted to focus Yahoo as a technology company, although I haven't been able to find direct quotes of him saying that.  Instead, I found a lot of rhetoric from him about focusing on core properties and cutting less profitable initiatives.  But whatever direction he had chosen, the decision has now apparently been unmade yet again.

I'm not sure which is the right strategy, but it's pathetic that the decision is being determined by a fudged resume.  And how incredibly sad it is for Yahoo's employees and shareholders that the company just wasted another five months of precious turnaround time. 

When you're trying to revive a company, the worst thing you can possibly do is be unclear on the strategy.  Employees can't commit, priorities can't be set, everything freezes while the staff waits to hear what they'll be asked to do.  Every time there's s shift like this, another round of experienced employees put their resumes on the street.

I think Yahoo still has enormous assets that could make it a vibrant, profitable player in the Internet for the long haul.  And it may well be that a media-focused strategy is the better focus for the company.  But make no mistake about it, this change isn't a victory.  You're watching people argue about fire-fighting technique in a burning house, and while they argued another room just collapsed.

Sunday, 29 April 2012

The "Bubble" and What's Really Going on with Startups

Today's New York Times declares that there an investment "bubble" in Silicon Valley being concealed by venture capitalists, and that it's so out of control that startups are being told not to generate revenue for fear of disrupting their fantasy valuations (link).

I think the article is about 1/3 correct and 2/3 nuts.  Yes, some startup valuations do seem amazingly high.  No, there isn't some grand conspiracy, and there isn't necessarily a bubble. 

This is an important issue for the mobile tech world because mobile startups are a huge part of the so-called bubble.  If you're working in a mobile startup, or thinking about doing one, you need to understand what's happening.  Here's my take:

I've spent more than a year pitching the startup I'm working in, Zekira, to VCs and angels in Silicon Valley.  I've met with scores of them, taken them to breakfast and coffee, and had long philosophical conversations with them about our company in particular and startups in general.  I have friends and former co-workers who now work in the VC and angel world.  I've also spent a huge amount of time networking with other entrepreneurs, successful and otherwise, and the conversation always turns to the fund-raising process.  So while I don't claim to be the world's greatest expert on startup funding, I do have a pretty good ringside seat.  Here's my list of venture funding myths and realities as they relate to the Times article:


Myth 1.  Venture capitalists and angels are in the business of creating new technology products.  Not true, and in this respect the article is right.  Many people who work as VCs and angels are passionate about technology and love to be personally involved with new tech products.  They give great, enthusiastic advice.  But their business is to create companies they can sell.  Period.  They don't get paid until a company either gets acquired or goes public, so their focus is on creating companies that they can sell to someone for a markup.

There's nothing new about this.  Venture capital has always worked this way.


Myth 2.  We are in another tech bubble "worse" than 1999 (in the words of the article).  In the late 1990s, valuations of all tech companies, startups and otherwise, were wildly over-optimistic.  This situation made it easy for VCs to take new tech companies public at a much earlier stage, and at a higher value, than was possible previously.  As one VC explained to me at the time, "there's market demand for companies that are much less mature than those we launched in the past, so we're going to fulfill that demand."

Because the entire stock market was involved, and because immature companies were offered in IPOs, the retirement fund of every American was put at risk.  That's not the situation today.  The market valuations of existing tech companies are not wildly out of whack (a point made well here).  The startups being sold without revenue are almost all being peddled to other tech companies, not to the public.  Facebook and Google and some other big firms have decided that they need to buy consumer internet and mobile companies with rapidly growing audiences.  Competition between them has driven up the valuation of those companies.

Are the valuations inappropriate?  I don't know, but Facebook and Google and the rest are big and successful and presumably know what they're doing.  They can also afford to lose the money they're spending.  So even if there is a bubble, at this point I don't think is is even remotely the sort of economic threat it was in the late 1990s.

As for the VCs' role in this, they're just doing what they always do, fulfilling the demand for a particular type of company.


Myth 3.  Startups are being told not to make revenue because that will disrupt their valuations. 

Oh, please.

The reality is that there are at least two tracks of startup activity, which I will label trendy and traditional.  The trendy startups are web and mobile services hoping to be acquired by the big web players.  For those companies, the source of their valuation is the number of users they attract and the rate at which they grow.  Revenue is irrelevant because Facebook and friends aren't buying revenue, they are buying market position.

In a trendy startup, making revenue is a problem because it distracts you from the goal of growing the audience.  The VCs are right to tell companies to disregard it.

But the traditional startups are treated very differently.  In those companies, the VCs are looking for a strong team, good product, and proven revenue.  In fact, the problem is not that companies are being told not to make revenue, it's that even angels are often demanding that companies have a customer base and substantial revenue streams before they'll make an investment.  In other words, the investors don't act like the stereotype of early-stage people who fund a cool idea, they act more like banks.

From my perspective, it looks like most of the big VCs are investing in a mix of trendy and traditional startups.  Among the angels there seem to be different circles, some specializing in trendy startups and some specializing in traditional ones.  But the trendy startup scene gets almost all the public attention.  It's what drives the startup weblogs, it drives the big drinking parties, it brings people out to the conferences, and it generates most of the press coverage for spectacular acquisitions.

You often see news articles focus on the trendy startups as if they're the only thing happening in venture capital.  That's exactly what the Times article did.

The trendy startup scene is entertainment, spending a weekend in Vegas without the long drive across the desert.  Like gambling, the attraction of trendy startups is that you might get wildly rich for a small investment of money and time.  Also like gambling, you'll probably lose your shirt. 

Is that a bad thing?  Only if you bet money and time that you can't afford to lose.

The danger to the public (and to the economy as a whole) will be if and when trendy startups start to be offered up in IPOs.  If that happens, it will be very important for all of us, the New York Times included, to raise an alarm very loudly.  But that's not the situation we're in today.  Calling today's situation a bubble is crying wolf, because it may cause people not to pay attention when there really is a problem in the future.

Thursday, 26 April 2012

Apple is Not Sony

I'm not sure what I disagree with more, Forrester Research's glib prediction that Apple will be the next Sony (link), or the assumption that it's even possible to predict something that complicated.  Let me start with the second issue.

The longer I've been in the tech industry, the more I've come to realize that predictions about it are usually worthless. 



Leave aside the big failed dreams like nuclear-powered aircraft (link) and the transatlantic train tunnel (link).  Even products that seem relatively straightforward can be very hard to predict.  The industry thought tablets and e-books were imminent for at least a decade before someone got them right, and we're still waiting for micro fuel cells and flexible screens.

There are so many moving parts in the industry, and success depends on so many tiny details of execution, that it's basically impossible to predict even things that look, in retrospect, like they were inevitable.

If it's that hard to predict the fate of individual technologies that have been studied for decades, imagine the difficulty of predicting the fate of an entire company made up of thousands of people and numerous product lines.  What you can do is predict what could happen, and even take a guess at the odds.  We've all been collectively doing that lately with RIM and Nokia.  But even to make that kind of prediction you need to look at companies' management, products, customer base, financial status, and technologies, plus do an assessment of its competitors.  Forrester did none of that for Apple.  Instead it drew a simple little equation, based on sociological theory:  Apple was led by a charismatic founder, as was Sony.  After Sony lost its charismatic founder, the company declined.  Apple has now lost its charismatic founder, so it'll decline too.

Forrester is an excellent research firm, and I have huge respect for its quantitative market research.  But in this case I'm not buying its prediction, for a couple of reasons:

First, although it's accurate to say that Sony declined after the loss of Akio Morita, it's not clear that the company's decline was caused solely or even primarily by the loss of Morita.  Here's a chart from Yahoo Finance of Sony's stock price since 1985:



The red arrow marks 1994, the year when Morita stepped down after suffering a stroke.  Ignore the ridiculous spike in the middle caused by the Japanese economic bubble; the important point is that at its peak in 2007, 13 years after Morita left the company, Sony's stock price was double what it was when he left.  The PlayStation, Sony's most vibrant tech product today, was started under Morita but is generally credited to Ken Kutaragi and his sponsor Norio Ohga, the man who succeeded Morita.

I have no doubt at all that Akio Morita was central to the building of Sony.  But I think its decline stems from a lot more than just his departure.

In a similar vein, I am not at all persuaded that the success of Apple under Steve Jobs can be credited entirely to his presence.  I worked there for almost all the time he was gone, and Apple without Steve had a lot of strengths -- a strong engineering team, a strong product management culture, great industrial designers and artists and marketing gurus, and a beloved brand with fanatical users.  What the company didn't have, I think, was leadership capable of making all those strengths mesh.  Some of Apple's work was wonderful (the Macintosh II and the PowerBook computers come to mind), and some of it was completely forgettable.  Management was not able to get the company consistently united around a single set of long-term goals.  Instead the company lurched from initiative to initiative, some of them pushed by outside consultants, many underfunded or contradictory.  Apple's culture of passive resistance, created in part by Steve Jobs himself during his first time at the company, made the problems worse.

What Jobs brought to Apple when he returned, more than anything else, was focus.  He committed Apple to a relatively narrow set of initiatives, and made sure everyone in the company got behind them.  That let Apple's existing strengths shine through to the market.  Jobs was able to rescue Apple because it was only partially broken.

Forrester's article depicts Apple under Jobs as a company of followers who waited to be given their marching orders from on high.  That theory sounds reasonable if you don't know anyone who works at Apple, but I do.  The folks I know there are team players, but by no means are they passive followers.  I think the real risk is not that Apple without Jobs will drift, but that it may revert to its old bad habits.  Will the company's management team continue to work together, or will it fall into passive resistance?  Can Tim Cook enforce discipline without alienating the big talents (and big egos) scattered throughout the company?  Do the managers themselves recognize the need to cooperate in order to keep Apple on top?

Forrester can't know the answer to that question.  Neither do I.  Yes, at some point Apple will decline; nothing lasts forever.  But unless somebody develops the ability to read minds, we can't predict when Apple will come apart.  And in the tech industry, if you don't know when, you don't know anything.

=====

If you'll forgive me for a brief commercial message, I wanted to let you know that we just de-cloaked Zekira, the software project that I've been working on for more than a year.  Zekira is an app that helps you recall the context around any bit of information in your life -- a name, meeting, file, etc.  You use it to answer questions like "how do I know this person?" and "what's the context for this meeting?"

Zekira runs on Mac and Windows, and is in early beta.  It's aimed at busy professionals who are overloaded with more computer information than they can keep track of.  The more that you save old files, messages, and contacts, the more Zekira can do for you. 

You can learn more about Zekira at our crowdfunding site: www.indiegogo.com/zekira   In exchange for a donation to the project, we're offering everything from beta access to Zekira to a unique "first-come, first-served" opportunity to place display advertising in Mobile Opportunity.

Tuesday, 17 April 2012

The Two Faces of RIM

At the risk of turning this weblog into the "BlackBerry channel," I wanted to add a couple of additional thoughts to my post on Research in Motion's recent earnings and strategy announcement (link).  There was an interesting divergence in the press and analyst comments about Thorsten Heins' statement that RIM would refocus on enterprise customers.  Commentators in the US and Canada generally responded to it fairly well, while those in Europe and other parts of the world were a lot more negative.

I think that's because there are really two BlackBerry customer bases, one in North America, and one in the rest of the world.  I wrote about this a year and a half ago (link), but I didn't think about how it related to RIM's earnings situation, and neither did a lot of other people.

To summarize, in North America, where RIM first came to prominence, its products tend to be seen as business tools.  They were first adopted by businesspeople who had a strong need for up-to-the-minute communication, including Wall Street traders and government officials.  As a result, RIM's image and core customer base in North America has always focused on business professionals.  The reality was more mixed; RIM did reach some non-professional users in North America, aided by operator marketing campaigns that included a memorable T-Mobile TV ad that praised the benefits of a BlackBerry flip phone designed to prevent "butt-dialing" (link).  But the most popular smartphones for non-business consumers in North America tended to be the Sidekick, and later iPhone and various Android models.

The situation was different in the rest of the world.  BlackBerry came to market there later, and people in many countries were not as enamored of real-time e-mail as they were in the US and Canada.  In those countries, BlackBerry generally caught on as a low-cost youth messaging phone, aided by RIM's BlackBerry Instant Messenger service, which lets consumers see when their texts have been read.  The relatively low parts cost of a BlackBerry compared to other smartphones also helped RIM reach consumer-friendly price points.  In some countries, BlackBerry established a strong network effect among young people.  If everyone else in your social group has BlackBerry Messenger, you'll be completely left out if you don't use it as well.

As in North America, there are exceptions.  You can find business users of the BlackBerry anywhere in the world.  But I think it's fair to say that the average person in North America tends to see BlackBerry as a professional business product, while the average person in the rest of the world tends to see BlackBerry as a youth consumer product.

This explains the differing reactions to RIM's announcement.  Observers in North America (including me) tended to view it as a long overdue refocusing on RIM's first and most loyal customers.  Observers in other parts of the world tended to view it as a thick-headed betrayal of RIM's fastest-growing customer group.

Some of the reactions outside North America were very acerbic.  My favorite came from Andrew Orlowski of the Register (link), who noted the irony that RIM had made its announcement "with the English rioting season fast approaching."  Yes, he was that upset.

So which group is right?  I think they both are; it just depends on which face of RIM you see around you.  Both sides of RIM have a core of loyal customers, but both sides also have risks.  In North America, I think business users are largely saturated with smartphones, and this is where RIM's business has been losing the most share.  On the other hand, these customers produce the highest gross margins when happy, and they are not being targeted heavily by other smartphone companies.  In the rest of the world, RIM's base is younger and growing faster than its North American business base, but it's hard to picture BB Messenger competing successfully in the long term against social messaging through sites like Facebook.  RIM might be able to maintain BBM as a standard by licensing it to other phone companies, but that would destroy the differentiation of the company's hardware, leaving it to compete on raw price against Android licensees like Samsung and China, Inc.  I'd rather walk on razor blades.

So I can easily make a case for focusing on either one market or the other, with the idea being that if you work very hard you can at least hang onto part of your current base, giving you a foundation to grow from in the future.  But it's not clear that RIM is ready to make that sort of apocalyptic choice.  Instead, it sounds a lot like a company that wants to ride two horses at once.

A small group of observers said Heins' comments about enterprise had been taken out of context, and that it was important to listen to all of RIM's conference call, something that many people apparently didn't do at the time (including me, I am ashamed to say).   So I went back and reviewed the full transcript of RIM's call (link), and here's what I think I read:


"We plan to refocus on the enterprise business and capitalize on our leading position in this segment." 

RIM did definitely say that it's re-dedicating itself to serving enterprise customers.  But I am not clear on whether that means serving IT managers or individual business users (or both).  As I mentioned in my previous post, that is a big difference.  Individual business-oriented users are a segment; they will not go away.  And anyone who thinks those users all want to play games and listen to music on their smartphones is out of touch with reality.  But IT as a major channel for smartphone sales is waning.  Although focusing on IT might be a good tactic to preserve some short-term revenue, it's not a long-term strategy for the whole company.


"Other products competing in the bring-your-own-device segment is to create a compelling consumer offering. We believe that BlackBerry cannot succeed if we try to be everybody's darling and all things to all people. Therefore, we plan to build on our strengths to go after targeted consumer segments, and we will seek strong partnerships to deliver those consumer features and content that are not central to the BlackBerry valuable position, for example, media consumption applications."

So RIM did say that it's backing away from some investments on the consumer side.  But that does not mean it is abandoning its young users.  I think Heins is hinting that RIM will focus on messaging phones and use software licensing to give those phones media playback and gaming features.  Outsourcing is a typical tactic that tech companies use when in financial trouble.  Sometimes outsourcing actually does save you money, and sometimes you find that licensing and integrating the third party software costs you about the same as building it yourself.  So I don't know how well that will work out for RIM, but it doesn't necessarily mean they are dumping the consumer market.


"Another key area where we will be making significant change is in our services business. Here, I'm referring specifically to the consumer-oriented, value-added services business that we have attempted to build over the past 2.5 years through numerous various acquisitions....The heavy ongoing investment required to continue this initiative does not make sense given RIM's current market position and our relative strength. As a result, we will be looking at ways to scale back these activities and refocus resources on developing an integrated services offering that leverages RIM's strength, such as BBM, security and manageability."

This is the place where Heins definitely signaled cuts.  It sounds ominous for Gist and Tungle and the other mobile web startups RIM bought in the last couple of years.  I hope they're not all being thrown out, since I believe they could help to differentiate RIM's products, but recent acquisitions are often at risk in corporate restructurings because they are not viewed as part of the "core product offering."  (Just look at what happened to Palm.)  Besides, they do not usually have big revenue forecasts attached to them, so they can be cut without forcing a drop in the corporate earnings forecast.


Reading RIM's comments closely, it sounds like they're saying they want to preserve both their business user base in North America and their youth messaging base in the rest of the world.  That's sensible from a revenue preservation standpoint, but it means that RIM will continue to be serving two masters with very different needs.  Compare that to Apple, which basically makes one smartphone at a time.  It will be hard to cut a lot of engineering cost at RIM, and it will be very difficult to create products that please both North America and the rest of the world, especially if RIM tries to add some significant new differentiators.  Features that please its North American core are not likely to also please the international market, and price points that would be acceptable in North America will likely be too high for the rest of the world.  The danger is that RIM will be like an army fighting on two fronts, with its forces below critical mass on both sides.

For RIM, this is yet another layer of challenge and uncertainty on top of what was already a very challenging situation.  Although customers may be glad to hear that RIM's not abandoning either group, to me the two faces of RIM make its situation even more daunting.

Monday, 2 April 2012

Rebuilding RIM

There's something sick about our love of disaster movies.  We take pleasure in seeing great works of ego laid low -- that unsinkable ship is going down, the fireproof skyscraper is going to burn all the way to the top.  I think many observers are now watching Research in Motion like a disaster movie: It's too big to ignore, too sick to survive, every quarter is a new plot twist of devastation.  Some of the press coverage is taking on a mournful air of inevitability:

"RIM weighs bleak options," says the Wall Street journal (link).  The article quotes a customer as saying a recent meeting with RIM officials was "like going to a wake." 

But the reality is that RIM's future is not yet decided.  Definitely the odds are against it.  But well-known brands have an amazing ability to come back; people are almost always willing to give them another chance.  (Check the history of Packard Bell, a 1920s radio brand that came back as a 1980s computer brand.  Heck, you could probably revive Palm if HP took its cold dead hands off the thing.)  RIM's fate depends on a huge number of unpredictable details, some of which haven't even happened yet, and others that we don't know because we're not company insiders. 

So we can't predict what will happen to RIM, but we can talk about what the company needs to do to survive.  If nothing else it's an interesting case study for anyone who needs to turn around a tech company.


Step one: Acknowledge the problem in public

One of the smartest marketing people I ever worked with is Christopher Escher.  He was at Apple for a long time, and then served in the early days at Google.  Chris said that the process of rehabilitating a company's image was like moving the hands of a clock. Having a great image was at 12:00.  A company's image could stay in that position for a long time as long as it didn't have too much bad news.  But if bad news built up, the hands eventually slipped over to the 3:00 position, which meant you were perceived to be a troubled company.

Chris said companies always want to force the hands to go backwards to 12, because they want to get past the pain.  But his insight was that you can never do that.  First you have to acknowledge the problem (3 pm), articulate your plan (6 pm), and then show that you're making progress at fixing it (9 pm).  I think Chris had some other stages in there, but you get the general idea.  Only after you had taken all of the intermediate steps, and posted improved financials as a result, would people believe that you had actually earned your redemption and returned to stability at 12.


The business redemption clock, a concept by Christopher Escher.

A good example of this process in action was Stephen Elop's moves at Nokia after he became CEO.  The notorious "burning platform" memo, which I believe was deliberately leaked, acknowledged the problems at Nokia and made its later moves much more credible to the press and analysts.  That doesn't mean Elop made the right moves, or that they will work, but if he had denied there was a problem, people would not have even paid attention to his later moves. 

Until its earnings announcement last week, RIM was still trying to make the clock hands go back to 12, and it wasn't working.  All it did was convince people that management was out of touch.  When RIM acknowledged the depth of the problem, suddenly the tone changed in some of the coverage.  "RIM finally seems to get it," CNET declared (link). 

There is a downside to acknowledging the problem: you make it worse.  Remember the despair and disbelief that "burning platform" created among Nokia fans (link).  You frighten any customers who aren't already worried, and partners may delay or cancel their work with you.  As you'll see, this is a problem with many of the steps you have to take to fix a broken tech company -- the medicine makes you even sicker at first.


Step two: Focus

Almost by definition, a troubled tech company will be trying to create too many products and funding too many business initiatives, the leftovers from more optimistic times.  There isn't enough revenue to pay for all of them, so you have to eliminate some.  This is an agonizing process.  Usually there is current or forecasted revenue tied to every project (not enough revenue, but some).  So when you cut them, you don't just lower your expenses, you also reduce further your expected revenue.  That forces you to cut even more.

Companies often default to keeping their most profitable product lines, because that requires the smallest cuts.  "We're focusing on the core," the executives say.  But usually the most profitable product lines are the oldest ones with the worst growth prospects.  Focus on them and you'll lock the company into an irreversible decline.

The right way to focus is to plan from the bottom up.  Decide what you want the company to be, who the target customers are, and what special value you'll deliver to them.  Fund the projects that support that goal.  Everything else, no matter how valuable or emotionally important, is a candidate to be cut.  If those cuts don't reduce your expenses enough, revisit the goal and make it even more tightly focused, allowing you to kill more things.

This process forces you to slaughter sacred cows.  Steve Jobs returns to Apple, and decides the company will focus on making Macs for creative people.  Out goes Newton, out goes twenty years of painfully-assembled enterprise sales infrastructure, out goes the printer business.  Lou Gerstner decides IBM will be a services company; he kills OS/2, pulls its PCs out of retail, and preps that business for sale. 

RIM's focus is questionable at this point.  Thorsten Heins appeared to be very focused when said that RIM would "refocus on the enterprise business" because "BlackBerry cannot succeed if we tried to be everybody’s darling and all things to all people."  But the next day two RIM executives denied that the company was exiting the consumer market (link).

One of three things happened.  Either:

--Heins' remarks were remarkably badly scripted, and the company really doesn't plan to back away from the consumer market.  This would be a bad sign for the company's ability to execute.  How in the world could you botch a critical message like that in an important earnings call?  Get your act together.  Or:

--Heins really does plan to back away from the consumer market, but some others in the company are in denial about it and are trying to spin-doctor him.  This is unlikely since two executives delivered the same correction.  But I've seen weirder things happen.  Or:

--RIM plans to exit the consumer market but doesn't want to say so yet because it needs to sell all of its current products that are still in inventory.  I suspect that's the reality.  Shamefully sloppy marketing by RIM if tghey raised this issue without understanding the impact it would have on sales.  RIM needs to be crisper if it is to survive.

Messaging aside, the impact of a RIM focus on enterprise depends on your definition of "enterprise."  If RIM is planning to focus on top-down corporate sales through IT managers, good luck and goodbye.  The long-term trend is that IT has less and less control over the mobile device choices of users in the company, so RIM would be tying itself to a dying sales channel.  But if by "enterprise" RIM means it will focus on the needs of individual businesspeople rather than entertainment-hungry teenagers, that is RIM's best prospect for getting reasonable margins, and probably its best chance to survive.

Some of the diversity of reactions to Heins' remarks has been driven by commentators making different assumptions about the definition of "enterprise."  Roger Cheng at CNET assumed it meant business end-users, and praised the change.  On the other hand, Horace Dediu assumed it meant selling through IT managers, and was utterly dismissive (link).

The important question is what Thorsten Heins meant, and we don't know the answer to that. 


Step three: Get a win

The next step is to hold onto your installed base.  This is important for any device company, because your loyal customers are the nucleus from which you'll grow in the future.  No one else is going to hang out with you right now because you're damaged goods.  The base is especially important for RIM because they're paying monthly service fees to the company.  That high-margin revenue stream is critical to RIM's recovery, and must be maintained.  I was encouraged that even amidst all the bad news RIM still grew its subscriber base slightly last quarter.  I doubt that will continue, but if RIM can keep the base close to even, it'll help a lot with the future transitions.

This may be why the company was so sensitive to the idea that it would "abandon" consumers.  It's not the right time to send that message to the public, even if it is true.

Instead, you need to lavish love on the installed base.  That means giving them special discounts for buying a new BlackBerry, telling them how important they are, and getting them excited about the product's future.  They have heard those promises before, though, so to make it credible RIM needs some nice, solid new products.

I'm not saying killer products.  Those would be great, but since RIM was dysfunctional, I doubt there are killers in the pipeline.  At this point, it would be enough to ship a couple of very solid, well executed devices that deliver on RIM's expected value and don't crash.  Think of the role that the iMac played in Apple's recovery.  The device itself wasn't all that spectacular, but it was iconically Apple, and proved that the company was reconnecting with its values.  It engaged loyal Mac users emotionally, gave them a reason to believe, and put Apple back in the game.

So Heins should look at the devices in RIM's pipeline for the next six months, and focus everyone on implementing the few that look most promising on the core BlackBerry values of reliability, convenience, and great messaging.  Stop work on everything else.  It's better to have one or two wins than four mediocre products.  And stop producing a slightly different model for every mobile operator.  You can't execute well on that complexity; it's part of what got you in trouble.

Will this lose you some operators?  Yes it will, but it's better to have a smaller channel that is enthusiastic about your products than an overstocked channel that doesn't care.  (Again, look at the way Apple trimmed dealerships when it was working on its comeback.)


Step four: Create differentiation


Now you've focused the company and momentarily stabilized the installed base, or at least slowed its bleeding.  Next you need to add a few differentiators -- unique features that do things your customers will love and will drive them to come into stores and demand your products.  Create no more than three of these features.  You can't effectively advertise more than three anyway, so it's better to do three really well than to have six that kind of mostly work.

If you get these features right, your target customers will forgive dozens of other flaws in order to obtain the value of your differentiators.  This is what gets you off the hook for copying every feature of the iPhone, which you can't afford to do and won't implement well anyway (case in point, RIM's product history for the last several years).

What are those features?  I have some ideas, but a lot depends on which technologies RIM has in house and how talented its engineers and product managers are.  There are plenty of important unsolved problems RIM can tackle for businesspeople on the go.  Things like meeting planning, managing e-mails and text messages while you're driving, and finding parking in a crowded city might all benefit from RIM's integrated client-server architecture.  There are also plenty of opportunities to integrate BlackBerry uniquely with business infrastructure.  BlackBerry was first successful because it integrated so reliably with Microsoft Outlook and Exchange.  What could RIM accomplish if it applied that same sort of focus to Salesforce.com or Dropbox or LinkedIn?

RIM has the pieces to build some of these solutions -- it has bought a number of startups like contact manager Gist and calendar manager Tungle.  I hope those are being viewed as part of the solution rather than random acquisitions that now need to be tossed out.

You'll notice that I'm not saying anything about BlackBerry OS 10.  That's because it almost certainly can't be a differentiator, for several reasons:
--The first release of an OS is almost always focused on just making the basics work properly.  If BlackBerry 10 is stable and doesn't crash, that is probably the most you can expect from it.  Maybe OS 10 will let RIM announce that its phones now suck less, but that's not a differentiator, that's table stakes.
--Until very recently, RIM's main explanation for why it needed BlackBerry 10 was so it could match the multimedia and entertainment features of iOS.  If that has been the development focus, it's very unlikely that the OS has a lot to offer to businesspeople in its first version.
--The average customer does not buy an operating system.  In the tech industry, we pay a lot of attention to operating systems because we know they are important enabling technologies.  But what customers respond to is the features they enable.  When is the last time you heard someone say they bought a mobile phone because its OS did a better job of paging memory or scheduling symmetric multiprocessing?

What about the idea of RIM licensing out its operating system?  Forget about it.  First of all, I doubt there are any customers.  But even if they are, the distraction of serving the different demands of various licensees would tear the OS team apart. RIM just doesn't have the money and staff to make this work.  Its best play is to deeply integrate its OS, devices, and services to create unique systems.  That sort of stuff is hard for Android to copy, and challenging even to Apple.


So those are the four steps:  Acknowledge the problem, focus (and cut brutally), find a quick win, and create differentiation.  Each step sounds fairly straightforward, but the hard part is that you have to get them all right, and you have to do them fast.  It's like doing brain surgery on yourself while driving your car down the freeway at 60 miles a hour.  Any mistake can be fatal.

The most difficult steps are the third and fourth, finding a quick product win and creating differentiation.  Typically a major new product or differentiator takes 18 months to implement, even if you're moving fast.  I think RIM probably has six months to roll out a product win, and at most 12 months to show some major new differentiators.  Go beyond that, and the installed base may be draining away faster than you can refill it.  When Steve Jobs returned to Apple, he was lucky that the industrial design team that created the iMac was already in place.  We'd better hope there are some great half-completed projects in the labs at RIM that Heins can focus the team on. 

What to watch.  It's because of uncertainties like this that no one can predict if RIM will survive.  But there is a metric we can watch to assess the company's chances: cash.  Cash to a device company is like altitude to an airplane. When a device company fails, it's usually because it runs out of the cash it needs to build inventory and advertise a new product release.  RIM currently has about $1.8 billion in easily-available cash, down about $300 million from a year ago.  Net income was $1.1 billion.  For comparison, in 1997 Apple lost $1 billion and had $1.5 billion in cash left.  Eighteen more months and it would have been dead.

So RIM is not as acutely sick today as Apple was in 1997.  But the BlackBerry base is not as loyal as the Mac base was, and Thorsten Heins isn't Steve Jobs.  The danger to RIM isn't an instant collapse, it's an accelerating decline into irrelevance.  That decline may already be irreversible.  If it isn't, RIM needs to act urgently to turn it around.  Acknowledging the problem is a good (if belated) start, but the hard work is still to be done.

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